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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Estate of JAMES
JOHN LATSIS (also sometimes known
as "LATSES"),

l
C

ase

N

o. 7954

Deceased

APPELLANT'S' BRIEF

This appeal is taken from orders entered December
12, 1952, dismissing the petition of the heirs of James
John Latsis, deceased, residing in Greece. That petition
alleged improper acts of the administrators in making
other than the proper intestate distribution without appropriate notice to those non-residents, and that the distributions made were contrary to the prior order of the
probate court which provided for distribution upon
agreement by the heirs in Greece, which agreement was
never had or obtained. That petition further prayed
that distribution should be ordered according to the laws
of succession.
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STATE~1ENT

OF FACTS

Dilnitrious John Latsis, also known as J mnes John
Latsis, died intestate at Salt Lake City, Utah on February 5, 1944 and left surviving him as his heirs Virginia
Latsis, his widow, Vassilios John Latsis, sometin1es
known as vVilliam J. Latsis, brother, Nickolaoas Latsis,
sometimes known as Nick J. Latsis, brother, John G.
Latsis, sometimes knovvn as Constantinos John Latsis,
only son of Gust J. Latsis, deceased brother, and Peter
J. Latsis, brother (Tr. 4, 158-159). At the time of the
death of said decedent all of said heirs, with the exception of Virginia Latsis and Peter J. Latsis, resided at
Asterion, Laconia, in the Province of Parmon, Sparta, in
Greece (Tr. 184). The estate consisted of assets appraised by the Inheritance Tax appraisers at $89,499.11,
of which $56,259.00 was real property (Tr. 76-82).
On :March 14, 1944 Letters of Administration were
issued to Utah Savings & Trust Company and Virginia
Latsis (Tr. 8) and they qualified as such administrators and ever since have been and now are the duly qualified and acting administrators of said estate; on I\Iarrh
8, 1944 the Honorable A. H. Ellett, one of the judges of
the District Court of the Third Judicial District, in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, upon his own motion, appointed N. J. Cotro-Manes, an attorney at law
duly authorized to practice in the State of Utah to act
' (Tr.
as attorney for the non-resident heirs of said estate
240-241).
On December 12, 19-t-4 the administrators of said
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
estate entered into a stipulation with Peter J. Latsis and
N. J. Cotro-Manes representing the non-resident heirs,
whereby it was stipulated and agreed that the said four
heirs other than Yirginia Latsis would receive as their
full distributive portion of said estate the sun1 of $10,000.00; that said stipulation further provided "That the
said payment and settlement shall be binding and conclusive as to each of the said four heirs, particularly
John Latsis, \Villiam J. Latsis, Nick J. Latsis and John
G. Latsis, upon the acceptance of his portion of said fund
and the execution of the necessary instruments to receipt
therefor and to assign his said interest and release the
said estate. That the said settlement shall become binding as to each of the said heirs accepting the same and
executing such instruments." (Tr. 86-88). On February
27, 1945 the Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr., one of the
judges of the District Court of the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, after a
hearing, entered an order approving the stipulation for
settlement with the heirs, which order provided, among
other things, "It is further ORDERED that the said
agreement and distribution shall become binding and
conclusive as to each of the said four heirs upon the
acceptance by him, or by his heirs at law, of said payments." (Tr. 95-97) ; that the only heir that accepted the
payment provided by said stipulation was Peter J. Lats1s,
who accepted the sum of money and executed the release
and assignment required (Tr. 123-124).
On August 22, 1945 the adn1inistrators of saicl

t~sta~-c
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filed their petition for approval of their final ac•~ount
and for a decree of distribution, and in said petitwn the
following allegations were made:
"5. In the course of probate, a petition was
presented for and on behalf of the heirs of the said
decedent other than Virginia Latsis, his wife.
This petition set forth the desirability of making
a settlement with, and distribution to, the other
said heirs prior to the final distribution hereof.
In said petition filed in the. above proceeding on
February 13, 1945, the said heirs set forth their
reasons for desiring a settlement of all their
claims and interest against the said estate for the
sum of $10,000.00 and for an earlier distribution
to them based on the estimated value of their
interest herein. This petition was consented to by
Virginia Latsis and by your petitioners.
"On F'ebruary 21, 1945, a hearing was had in
which the attorney for said heirs other than Yirginia Latsis, presented evidence in support of the
said petition, whereupon the same was allowed,
and on F'ebruary 27, 1945, an order of this court
was duly made and filed herein approving the
said petition and fixing the attorney's fees of
the attorney for the heirs and directing the administrators of this estate to pay and distribute
to the said heirs and their attorney the said
amount of $10,000.00 in the manner set forth in
said order. It was also ordered that the balance
of the said estate be distributed to Virginia Latsis,
the surviving wife of the said decedent.
"6. Pursuant to the above-mentioned order,
the petitioners have paid and distributed $4,750
of said $10,000.00 as follows: To Peter J. Latsis,
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in full settlement - $2000.00; to John G. Latsis,
Nick J. Latsis and William J. Latsis - $500.00
each, through the A1nerican Express Company;
and to N. J. Cotro-:11anes, to apply on his attorney's fees as fixed by the Court- $1250.00. That
there remains to be paid on said settlement the
sun1 of $5,250.00 as follows: The amount of
$1500.00 each to the said three heirs, John G.
Latsis, Nick J. Latsis and vVilliam J. Latsis, and a
balance of $750.00 to Attorney N. J. Cotro-Manes.
That there is no cash in the hands of petitioners
from the estate to complete the said distribution,
or to pay the administrators fees, attorneys fees
and the cost of closing the estate. That Virginia
Latsis, the sole remaining distributee of the said
estate has deposited with the Utah Savings &
Trust Company the said sum of $5,250.00 for distribution to said heirs and their attorney, and
has agreed to deposit and provide the additional
sums necessary to pay the remaining fees and
costs herein. That she prefers to provide the
necessary cash rather than have the petitioners
sell any of the property of the estate." (Tr. 106121).
On October 9, 1945 the court entered its order approving
the final account and made its decree of distribution and
stated tl1erein as part of its findings the following:
"4. The account of the petitioners as presen ted showed all receipts and all dis burs emen ts,
vouchers having been presented herewith covering
all disbursements, and it appeared that all such
have been regularly made and properly authorized. It further appears from the records and
files herein that under an order dated February
27, 1945 by Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr., Judge
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of the above-entitled Court, a settlement with
all of the heirs of said deceased, other than Virginia Latsis, was made and approved, by which
the said four heirs were to receive $10,000.00 as
their full share and in settlement of the claims of
each and all of said heirs against this said estate.
That in said proceeding it was ordered that Attorney N. J. Cotro-Manes, theretofore e1nployed, and
appointed by the Court, to represent said heirs,
was to receive out of said sum of $10,000.00 as his
attorney's fees the sum of $2000.00, a portion to
be paid forthwith, and the balance upon the final
distribution to the said heirs, he to render the
additional services required in arranging and
insuring the receipt by the said heirs of the
amount which each is entitled to receive under
said settlement. That such distribution was to be
made to said heirs through the American Express Company or the Hellenic Bank Trust Company.
"5. That full settlement and payment has
been made to Peter J. Latsis, residing in Utah,
and his receipt, release and discharge filed herein.
That $1500 has been forwarded through the
American Express Company, being $500.00 each,
to each of the said three remaining collateral
heirs. That $1250.00 has been paid toN. J. Cotro~fanes, as attorney for the said heirs. That there
remains to be paid and disbursed the sum of $5,250.00, as follows: $1500.00, each, to John G. Latsis, Nick J. Latsis and William J. Latsis, and a
balance of $750.00 to Attorney N ..J. Cotro-Manes
when the prior distribution of said prior respective sums to each of said three heirs is completed.
"6. That there was, and is, insufficient cash
in the hands of the administrators of said estate
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
to make such payments and such distributions and
the expenses of closing the estate. That there has
been filed herein a statement and an agreement
on the part of Yirginia Latsis, the surviving wife
of the said deceased and the heir entitled to all the
remaining estate, in which she has agreed to pay
the necessary cash to take care of said charges
and expenses and to deposit with Utah Savings
& Trust Company the sum of $5,250.00, to be
transmitted as aforesaid. The said Utah Savings
& Trust Company has received and has filed herein its acknowledgment of the receipt of $5,250.00
to be transmitted to the said remaining heirs and
paid to their attorney, in the manner heretofore
ordered herein, and in the an1ounts aforesaid.
"It, also, appears that the administrators
herein have rendered special services, and that
the Utah Savings & Trust Company, as administrator, is entitled to an additional and extra allowance of $750.00.
"Receipts showing the payment, as aforesaid, by Virginia Latsis of the attorneys fees,
administrators fees and costs of closing the said
estate have been filed herein, and the estate is now
in condition .to be closed, and the administrators
discharged." (Tr. 126-128).
Then in the order of October 9, 1945 the court stated the
following:
"The settlement, payments and distribution,
and provision for distribution, made pursuant to
the order herein of February 27, 1945, and as
hereinabove set forth, is approved and allowed.
~ng

"It is further ordered that all of the remainproperties of the said estate, after the pay-
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n1ents and distributions aforesaid, of every nature, real or personal, whether discovered or undiscovered, and all property interests of the decedent at the time of his death, or acquired by his
estate, are hereby distributed to Virginia Latsis,
the surviving wife of the said decedent." (Tr.
128).
No notice was posted or 1nailed of the hearing of the
petition for approval of the stipulation, and upon which
hearing the order of February 27, 1945 was entered.
That order of February 27th specifically states "all the
parties having joined in said petition and being represented, no notice was required or ordered on said petition." (Tr. 95).
The notice given in relation to the hearing of the
petition on the final account and for distribution provided as follows:
"The petition of Utah Savings & Trust Co., et
al. administrators of the estate of James John
Latsis, etc. deceased, praying for the settlement
of final account of said administrators and for
the distribution of the residue of the estate, to the
persons entitled, and discharge has been set for
hearing on Wednesday, the 5th day of September, A. D. 1945, at ten o'clock A.M. at the County
Court House, in the Court Room of said Court,
in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah." (Tr.
105).
In accordance with the proof of mailing, a copy of the
above notice was forwarded to each of the heirs residing
in Greece.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The settlement pay1nents and distribution have never
been 1nade in accordance with the provisions of the order
of February 27, 1945. In fact, the three payments o,f
$500.00 each which were to be forwarded to the heirs
in Greece were returned by the American Express Cmnpany after deducting certain costs. The letter from the
American Express Cmnpany, dated December 31, 1945
(Tr.137), states:
"Our correspondents advise that they are unable to deliver the above remittances.
"We are, therefore, authorized to refund to
you the sum of $1,490.86 upon surrender of your
receipt. Please call at our office at your convenience, and we will be pleased to make refund to
you." (Tr. 137).
Mr. Cotro-Manes alleges the same facts in his petition
for the order authorizing the administrators to pay fees
filed in the court on or about the 9th day of January,
1946, wherein he states :
"8. That your petitioner has been advised
by the American Express Company that their correspondents at Athens, Greece, was not able to
deliver the above remittances and therefore they
have paid to the administrator as refund $1,490.86, $9.14 having been expended for cables." (Tr.
135).
On October 29, 1951 petitioners and appellants herein, being one heir and the representatives of two deceased
heirs in Greece, filed a petition directing the court's atSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tention to improper acts of the adininistrators and for an
order to show cause why the administrators should not
be required to properly administer the estate (Tr. 158172); on October 26, 1951 the court issued its order which,
among other things, required the administrators to show
cause why distribution sho~d not be made in accordance
with the order of February 27, 1945, or why the heirs
should not receive their respective portions of the estate
(Tr. 155-156). On August 1, 1952 Vassilios John Latsis,
sometimes known as Willimn John Latsis, one of the petitioners and appellants, filed a petition directing the
court's attention to improper acts of the administrators
and for an order to show cause why the administrators
should not be required to properly administer the estate
(Tr. 183-197). An order to show cause was issued on
August 1, 1952 (Tr. 180-181), which was duly served on
August 2, 1952. On November 20, 1951 the Utah Savings
& Trust Company, one of the administrators, filed its
motion to dismiss (Tr. 153-154), and on August 11, 1952
Virginia Latsis Zambukos, the co-administrator, filed a
motion to dismiss (Tr. 198-199), both of said motions
being identical and under part I thereof providing:
"TO DISMISS

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Lack of jurisdiction over the person.
Insufficiency of process.
Failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.
Failure to join an indispensable party." (Tr.
198).
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On N oven1ber 25, 1D5~, after the n1otions to dismiss had
been argued, an order granting the 1notions to dismiss
each of said petitions was entered (rrr. 203-204), and
thereafter on December 12, 1952 the court again entered
an order dis1nissing each of said petitions ( Tr. 205-208),
that later order providing in part:
"This dismissal is upon the grounds of Sub&ivision I, the 'Motion to Dismiss' of Utah Savings and Trust Company, and it is not necessary,
therefore, to consider the Sub-division II, its ':M.:otion to Strike', nor Subdivision III designated as
'Requirement of Authority', and these two subdivisions have not been passed upon or decided.
"This order, effective this date, takes the
place of the Order of Dismissal herein dated November 25, 1952, and which latter order has been
and is hereby vacated and set aside." (Tr. 206).
A similar provision is contained in the order dismissing
the petition in relation to Virginia Latsis Zambukos.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT 1.
CLAIMS OF PETITIONERS HAVE NOT BEEN SETTLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PETITION AND
STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT AND ORDER OF FEBRUARY 27, 1945.

POINT 2.
. DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION HAS NOT BEEN CARRIED
OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS TERMS.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT 3.
STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT HAVING FAILED,
THE ESTATE SHOULD BE DISTRIBUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAWS OF SUCCESSION.

POINT 4.
PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO HAVE DISTRIBUTION MADE TO THEM OF THEIR DISTRIBUTIVE SHARES
OF THE ASSETS OF SAID ESTATE IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE LAWS OF SUCCESSION.

POINT 5.
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS ORDERS OF
DECEMBER 12, 1952, DISMISSING THE PETITIONS DATED
OCTOBER 26, 1951 AND AUGUST 1, 1952, RESPECTIVELY.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1.
CLAIMS OF PETITIONERS HAVE NOT BEEN SETTLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PETITION AND
STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT AND ORDER OF FEBRUARY 27, 1945.

For the purpose of discussing the question of
whether the petitioners have been paid in accordance
with the stipulation entered into by N. J. Cotro-Manes
on their behalf, we will assume that Mr. Cotro-l\fanes
had the authority to enter into such a Htipulation and
bind the heirs and that the court had jurisdiction and
authority to make its order of February '27, 1945. Vve
make this statement for the reason that there is serious
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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question in our minds as to whether Mr. Cotro-Manes,
in the first place, could enter into such a stipulation
where no notice was given to the heirs in question of the
hearing concerning the appointment of an attorney to
represent then1, and where there is no showing that after
his appointment by the court he ·was ever in communication with the parties or advised them of the nature of the
stipulation he was going to enter into, and where, in the
record, it further appears that no notice of the hearing
of the petition to approve the stipulation was either
posted or mailed or otherwise given to the heirs in
Greece.
But assuming, as above indicated, that the stipulation is binding and the order valid, it is apparent from
the record that the term.s and conditions of the stipulation and order. have never been fulfilled. The stipulation
and petition provides :
"That the said payment and settlement shall
become binding and conclusive as to _each of the
said four heirs, Peter J. Latsis, William J. Latsis,
Nick J. Latsis and John G. Latsis, upon the acceptance of his portion of said fund and the execution of the necessary instruments to receipt
therefor and to assign his said interest and release the said estate. That the said settlement
shall become binding as to each of said heirs accepting the same and executing such instruments."
(Tr. 87).
The order, in like language, states :
"It is further ORDERED that the said agreement and distribution shall become binding and
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conclusive as to each of the said four heirs upon
the acceptance by him, or by his heirs at law, of
said payments.
"It is further ORDERED that the said heirs
shall furnish, or that their attorney shall procure
from the said recipients of said payments, a
proper receipt therefor and an assignment and
relinquishment of all interest in this said estate,
and a release of the administrators herein, which
receipt and relinquishment shall be delivered to
the administrators.
"It is further ORDERED that upon the disbursement as herein provided to the said four
heirs hereinabove nmned, the balance of the said
estate of the said deceased, after the paYJ.nent of
all taxes, debts and other obligations, shall belong
to and shall be distributed to Virginia Latsis."
(Tr. 97).
There can be, and we believe there is, no dispute as to the
fact that three of said heirs, namely: William J. Latsis,
Nick J. Latsis and John G. Latsis, have never received
any sum of money whatsoever from the administrators
of said estate, nor have they ever signed any receipts
or releases as provided by the petition and stipulation
and the order. In fact, the record clearly indicates that
some of the money, if not all, is being held by the lT tah
Savings & Trust Company to date.
The question then arises whether a subsequent order
of the court, and namely, the order and decree settling
the final account and ordering distribution, dated October 9, 1945, has modified the stipulation and the order
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of February 27, 1945. Appellants contend that it has not
been Inodified and that, under the proceedings had, the
court had no jurisdiction to modify said order. It is true
that the order of October 9, 19-15 states "The settlement,
payments and distribution, and provisions for distribution, 1nade pursuant to the order herein of February 27,
1945, and as hereinabove set forth, is approved and
allowed." (Tr. 128). However, under the order of February 27, 1945 there was no provision made for the payment of this money to the Utah Savings & Trust C-?n1pany, and that order could not be modified by a subsequent order unless proper notice of the hearing for modification was given.

Bancroft's Probate Practice, Second Edition, Volume 1, Section 82, Page 191:
"A finding in a probate decree that due and
legal notice has been given is conclusive that the
court obtained jurisdiction of the proceeding, but
not that it extended to matters beyond those disclosed by the notice forming part of the record."
The notice posted and published covering the hearing of the petition for settlement of the final account and
for distribution contained no statement therein that the
order of February 27, 1945, or the stipulation covered
thereby, was to be modified, altered or changed in any
particular. The notice given was that "The petition of
Utah Savings & Trust Co., et al. administrators of the
estate of James John Latsis, etc. deceased, praying for
the settlement of final account of said administrators
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and for the distribution of the residue of the estate, to
the persons entitled, & discharge has been set for hearing* * *.'' (Tr. 105). If the heirs in Greece had received
knowledge of the terms of the stipulation and the order
of February 27, 1945, they knew they had not accepted
the same and, by ·the notice above given, they had no
knowledge that it was to be altered and changed and
that they were going to be required to accept the settlement regardless of their desires, and they would merely
be advised that they would receive the portion of the
estate that they would be entitled to regardless of any
clai1ned settlement. For the order of October 9, 1945 to
have been binding, notice must have been given; otherwise, it is invalid as to those portions that were not set
forth in the notice.
In Barrette v. Whitney, 36 Utah 574, 106 Pac. 52:2,
in a decision written by Justice Frick and concurred in
by Justice McCarty, the Utah court held that inasmuch
as probate proceedings are matters in rem no decree of
distribution should be void for want of notice where the
administrator was appointed by a court of competent
jurisdiction on statutory notice. To this opinion, Chief
Justice Straup vigorously dissented, pointing out the .
need for proper notice throughout the probate proceedings to protect the rights of the heirs, and in his dissenting opinion Chief Justice Straup pointed out the conflict in rationale of the majority opinion in protecting
real estate titles from subsequent attacks based on defects in the probate procedure as opposed to the rights
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of heirs to notice of proceedings during probate which
would affect the rights and title of the heirs.

Barrette v. Whitney has. not been followed by any
other jurisdiction and appears to be contrary to the great
weight of authority, which is uniformly to the effect that
proper notice upon distribution is jurisdictional. Bancroft's Probate Practice, Second Edition, Volume 4, Section 1135, Page 418; 21 Am. Jur. 650; 37 L.R.A. (N.S.)
368. The courts that have considered the matter of necessity of notice on the decree of distribution have, with
the exception of the Utah court, uniformly held that the
decree, in the absence of proper notice, is made without
jurisdiction and, therefore, may be collaterally attacked.
Hoppin v. Lang, 241 Pac. 636 (Mont.); Harrison v.
Cannon, 203 Pac. 2d 978 (Mont.) ; State v. Allen, 294
Pac. 681 (\Vyo.); Gassin v. McJunkin, 48 Pac. 2d 320
(Okl.); In re Estate of Parsell, 213 Pac. 40, 25 A.L.R.
1561 (Cal.) ; Carter v. Frahm, 141 N.W. 370 (S.D.) ; .
In re Hoscheid's Estate, 139 Pac. 61 (Wash.).
Section 75-12-6, Utah Code A1'1JYt.otated 1953, specifically provides that the petition for final distribution
shall contain the names and addresses of the heirs,
devisees or other persons entitled to participate in distribution and that upon the clerk's fixing the date of
hearing notice shall be given. We believe that to give this
provision for notice on the petition for final distribution
any meaning, such notice must be mandatory and it must
be such notice as will give the heirs a fair understanding
of the contents of the petition, the distribution prayed
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for, whether it be partial or final, and of other relief
sought.
In Child v. District Court of Second Judicial District, 80 ·utah 243, 14 Pac. 2d 1110, our court considered
the question as to whether heirship may be determined
before final distribution, and in considering the rights
of heirs to notice of such a determination the court
stated:
"It may be observed in passing that the complaint nowhere alleges that no action is pending
or to be taken in the administration of the estate
which 1nay adversely affect the heir's interest.
But, considered from this angle, it becomes
immediately apparent that the heir may be denied
from the beginning substantial rights. His right
to notice of all proceedings is important; sales
of property, mortgages, and family allowance, all
affect his rights, and if he is in fact an heir, he
should be afforded an opportunity to be heard in
respect thereto."
The court further stated:
"If the district court has jurisdiction to probate the estate, it should and must have the right
to fully protect the interests of all the heirs."
We respectfully submit that this court should reconsider its holding in Barrette v. Whitney and should
now give meaning to the sections of our probate code requiring notice, and that the requirement of notice should
be mandatory and jurisdictional. Our contention is that
to assure due process notice of distribution should be
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giYen to all of the heirs, and further that this notice
should have been of the type of distribution actually
prayed for, that is, a distribution in accordance with the
stipulation, which distribution would have materially
altered the share which the heirs could expect on an
intestate distribution and which latter they would naturally expect from a notice of a full and final distribution. Any notice disclosing any less information would
make the probate proceedings the instrument for perpetrating, by a series of in and of themselves legal acts,
a final vicious wrong in depriving the heirs in Greece
of their rightful inheritances.
POINT 2.
DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION HAS NOT BEEN CARRIED
OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS TERMS.

We contend that the order of October 9, 1945 has
not been complied with, and that it cannot be complied
with because of the fact that the order, in its directions,
incorporates the prior order of February 27, 1945, which
prior order is conditional and the conditions therein set
forth have never been accomplished. The order of February 27, 1945 is incorporated into the order of October
9, 1945 by the following language of the second order:·
"It further appears from the records and files
herein that an order dated February 27, 1945,
by the Honorable Ray Van Cott, J r;, Judge of
the above entitled court, and settlement with all
of the heirs of the said deceased, other than Virginia Latsis, was made and approved by which
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the said four heirs were to receive $10,000.00 as
their full share and in settlement of the claims of
each and all of the said heirs against this said estate. That in said proceeding it was ordered that
Attorney N.J. Cotro Manes theretofore employed,
and appointed by the Court, to represent said
heirs, was to receive out of said sum of $10,000.00
as his attorney's fees the sum of $2000.00, a portion to be paid forthwith and the balance upon
the final distribution to the said heirs, he to render the additional services required in arranging
and insuring the receipt by the said heirs of the
.amount which each is entitled to receive under
said settlement." (Tr. 126-127).
The incorporation by reference of the first order into
the final order of October 9, 1945 appears even more
clearly from the following portion of the final order:
"The settlement, payments and distribution
and provision for distribution made pursuant to
the order herein of F'ebruary 27, 1945, and as
hereinabove set forth, is approved and allowed."
(Tr. 128).

Horton v. Winbigler, 165 Pac. 423 (Cal.), involved
a situation of an incorporation into a final decree of
distribution of a prior agreement between the son and
the grandmother of the decedent, whereby the grandmother was to "take under the will one half of the moneys
of the estate to use and enjoy during her life." The California court held that since the agreement was referred
to in the decree of distribution it became a part of the
decree, and the following language was used:
"In making a decree of distribution a court
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1nay incorporate the provisions of the will therein
or a contract or agreement entered into between
the heirs and which is called to the attention of the
court with a view of having it incorporated in
the decree; and the court may, by express terms
or by apt reference there~o, incorporate said will
or contract in the decree so as to constitute it a
portion of its distributive terms. This is what
was done in the decree of distribution under consideration. The court incorporated the will and
the contract between plaintiff and Mrs. Brown as
to the respective interests which each should take
on distribution, and pursuant thereto made distribution accordingly. When a necessity arose
thereafter to construe said decree, the court was
not limited to a consideration of the particular
.provision of it, as claimed by appellant, but it was
the duty of the court to look to the will and the
contract which were made a part of the decree,
together with the other terms, in order to ascertain just what the terms of the distribution were,
because the distribution as declared by the court
was in accordance with the provisions of the will
and the agreement of the heirs. This declaration
and reference to the will and agreement made
them a part of the decree as effectually as though
set forth in it. The court was not, as appellant
asserts, allowing the admission of the will and
contract as matters extraneous to the terms of
the decree for the purpose of modifying or changing the decree of distribution. The court was admitting these instruments, which were in effect
part of the decree of distribution because referred
to therein and declared to be the basis of the decree itself, not to modify it or change it in any
particular, but for the purpose of construing it in
its entirety and determining just what was meant
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by all its distributive provisions. The right of the
court to incorporate provisions of a will o:r agreement by express reference in a decree of distribution and thereafter in an action involving a
consideration of the decree to resort to said will
and agreement as part of the decree in construing
its tern1s, as was done in this case, is well settled
in this state. Goldtree v. Thon1pson, 79 Cal. 613,
22 Pac. 50; Goad v. Montgomery, 119 Cal. 552,
51 Pac. 681, 63 Am. St. Rep. 145; McCloud v.
Hewlett, 135 Cal. 361, 67 Pac. 333."
The Utah case of In re Efferson's Estate, 70 Utah
258, 259 Pac. 919, adopts the same rule that a will may
be incorporated into and become a part of the decree and
that the will may be resorted to for the purpose of interpreting the decree.
"The propriety of resorting to the will to
explain and interpret the decree in the respects
mentioned cannot be doubted and when the will
is considered in connection with the decree there
is no uncertainty."
While the case of In re Ewer's Will, 170 Cal. 660, 171
Pac. 683, adopts the same rule as the Efferson case just
cited, we refer to the language in that case because it
is particularly appropriate to this case. In the instant
case a single phrase of the order states absolutely that
distribution of the residue is to be made to Virginia Latsis. If that single portion of the order alone were to be
considered, then there is no doubt that the distribution
of the residue is to be made to Yirginia Latsi:.;, but when
that portion of the order is considered together with the
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context of the entire order, which has incorporated in
it a separate order, then the real meaning of the order
is obtained, and that real meaning is that distribution
of the residue is not to be made unless the releases are
obtained from the heirs and unless the heirs conveyed
their interests to the other heir, Virginia Latsis. The following is quoted fron1 In re Ewer's Will, supra:
'' vVhile a single phrase of the decree, apart
frmn the context, though indefinite in itself, could
possibly be considered as a distribution of the
fund absolutely to Eliza B. Ewer, yet the decree
as a whole shows that the intention of the court
making it was to give the fund over to the trustee
to hold and dispose of it upon the trust stated in
the will, and in accordance therewith. It should,
therefore, be given that effect."
The order of distribution thus incorporates within
itself the order of February 27, 1945. That order in turn
incorporates within itself the petition and stipulation
filed February 13, 1945. vVe reach this latter conclusion
because the order of February 27, 1945 contains a reference to the petition and stipulation. The reference is
clear and concise and is in this language :
"It is further ORDERED that the said agreement and distribution shall become binding and
conclusive as to each of the said four heirs upon
the acceptance by him, or by his heirs at law, of
said payments." (Tr. 97).

It is by this apt reference to the agreement and to the
distribution that the petition and stipulation becomes
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incorporated into and a part of the order of February
27, 1945.
There are at least two other references in the order
of F'ebruary 27, 1945 by which the petition and stipulation is incorporated into the order of February 27, 1945.
N orinally, it is unnecessary for an order to recite the
facts upon which it is based because Section 75-14-15,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, does not require that the
facts be set out upon which the court has based its order,
but in the instant case there is ~recital in the order which
reads as follows :
"The Court finds the facts as recited in the
petition to be correct,***." (Tr. 95).
In order to determine what those facts are, it is necessary to refer to the petition and stipulation and, therefore, this reference is sufficient to cause the petition and
stipulation to be incorporated into and become a part
of the order of February 27, 1945. The petition and
stipulation can be used to explain and to interpret the
order of February 27, 1945. In our view it is not necessary to resort to the petition and stipulation in order
to learn the full meaning of the order of February 27,
1945. The order itself is specific and clear.
The net result is that the order of distribution has
incorporated within it both the order of February ~7,
1945 and the petition and stipulation filed February 13,
1945. The direction to the administrator:.; with reference
to distribution is contained in the order of distribution,
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a part of which are both the order of February 27, 1945
and the petition and stipulation of February 13, 1945..
Reading these documents together and giving effect to
their meaning, the direction to the administrators is that
distribution shall be made of all of the property (other'
than the $10,000.00) to V~rginia Latsis, only if the settlement "shall become binding and conclusive as to each
of the said four heirs * * *". -Similarly, the order of
February 27, 1945, becoming as it does a part of the final
order of distribution, decrees: "That upon the disbursement as herein provided to the said four heirs hereinabove named, the balance of the said estate of the said
deceased * * * shall belong to and be distributed to
Virginia Latsis" (Tr. 97). "Disbursement as herein
provided" meant when the disbursement would be accepted by each of the heirs there would also be required
"the execution of the necessary instruments to receipt
therefor and to assign his said interest and release the
said estate" (Tr. 87). In other words, disbursement as
provided in the order would not be complete until the
heirs did four things:
(1) Accepted the amount tendered
(2) Executed the necessary instruments to receipt
therefor
(3) Assigned his said interest and conveyed his title
(4) Released the said estate.
Since not one of these four things was done, it cannot be
contended that there has been "disbursement as herein
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provided to the s-aid four heirs", and since that has not
occurred, the balance of the said estate of the said deceased was not ordered to be distributed to Virginia
Latsis since the distribution never became binding and
since the order provided that "the balance of the said
estate of the said deceased * * * shall belong to and be
distributed to Virginia Latsis upon the disbursement as
herein provided to the said four heirs" Virginia Latsis
never became entitled to the balance of the said estate.
This is further made clear by the terms of the order :
"It is further ordered that all of the remaining properties of the said estate, after the payments and distributions aforesaid, * * * are hereby distributed to Virginia Latsis, the surviving
wife of the said decedent." (Tr. 128).
The proposed distribution to the four heirs never
was made; the distribution never became binding and,
therefore, the administrators should not have distributed
the real properties and residue to Virginia Latsis.
POINT 3.
STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT HAVING FAILED,
THE ESTATE SHOULD BE DISTRIBUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAWS OF SUCCESSION.

It is our contention that inasmuch as the conditions
imposed on the order of February 27, 1945 were never
c01npleted, and as that order was subsequently incorporated in the order of October 9, 1945, that subsequent
order was in fact a nullity as far as any distribution waH
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concerned and until a distribution in accordance with
the laws of succession is made this estate is still open
and the fiduciaries continue to be responsible until a
c01nplete and final distribution is made.
The intestate distribution to which the petitioners
were entitled would by our calculations amount to
$4,916.20 each, in comparison to the cash sum stipulated
to be distributed to each heir in Greece, namely, $2,000.00
after attorney's fees (Tr. 96). By the Inheritance Tax
Inventory and Appraisement (Tr. 99) the total property
was appraised at $79,829.11. Rents of $9,771.32 were
collected during probate and until June 26, 1945 (Tr.
116). This total in the hands of the administrators,
less the widow's dower interest of $18,753.00 and debts
and expenses of administration of $12,350.24 ( Tr. 99101), leaves $58,497.19. Of this amount the widow is by
statute entitled to $25,000.00 and one-half of the remainder, leaving $16,748.60 for distribution among the
brothers of decedent and their representatives. Peter
J. Latsis accepted $2,000.00 by his stipulation, leaving
$14,748.60 for a three-way division of $4,916.20 for each
of the brothers in Greece. This computation is based on
values as of the date of death of decedent. The real
properties of the estate have greatly appreciated in value
since 1944, and any computation of dollar value on
intestate distribution should be made as of the time
for distribution and should include therein rents and
profits collected and accrued to that time.
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resent certain named heirs, including Nick J. Latsis, a
brother of the decedent (Tr. 241). Before .the provisions
of the stipulation were carried out as to Nick J. Latsis,
as one of the heirs, said Nick J. Latsis died, leaving as
his heirs two minor children, John Nikolaou Latsis and
Panagiotou (Panayiotis) Nikolaou Latsis, who are now
and have been at all times material herein residents of
Greece (Tr. 213). Mr. Cotro-Manes was not appointed
to represent these minors or the heirs or estate of Nick
J. Latsis and he could thus in no way stipulate on behalf
of these minors in regard any settlement agreement.
If, by any means, Mr. Cotro-Manes can be said to have
represented the estate of Nick J. Latsis or John G.
Latsis, who was the minor child of Gust J. Latsis (Tr.
241), any such representation and the stipulation entered
into by Mr. Cotro-Manes were effective only until notice
could be given to all of the heirs in Greece and until
those heirs had an opportunity to affirm the stipulation,
or until the minor heir, John G. Latsis, and the estate
of Nick J. Latsis could disaffirm the stipulation. The disaffirmance of those parties was made in the form of their
petition to the probate court in this matter, which petition was made as soon as actual notice of the acts of the
administrators was received by the heirs in Greece.

Smith v. Williams, 139 S.E. 625, 54 A.L.R. 964
(S.C.), involved a situation where a property. settlement
was made on behalf of three minor heirs. The court
there stated that family settlements are favorites of the
law, but that "in an agreement of this character, infancy
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makes it voidable, not void. If disaffirmance is intended,
then the acts of disaffirmance must be made within a
reasonable time after the disability of infancy ceases."
In Lupton v. Bangs, 242 Pac. 830, 54 A.L.R. 979 ·
(Ore.), in a suit to enforce a family settlement, the court
held:
"While equity is anxious to encourage and
enforce family settlements in order to preserve
the peace and harmony of families, the parties
are required to deal with the utmost good faith
towards each other, and equity will readily seize
upon any fraud or unconscionable practice to
induce the settlement, to set it aside, in application of the well-established rule that, where there
is a confidential relation between relatives in
respect to an inheritance or distributive sha,res
of an estate, equity will readily relieve a party
who has yielded to the coercive influence of
another."
Utah law would appear to be clear that the administrator cannot be discharged until the estate has been
fully administered and a complete and final distribution
made to the heirs. In In re Barker's Guardianship, 103
Utah 109, 133 Pac. 2d 784, an order was entered that
the guardian "is discharged as guardian herein and his
bondsmen are hereby discharged and exonerated." The
court subsequently entertained a petition for an order
to show cause filed by the ward, an incompetent. In the
concurring opinion Judge Wolfe, then Chief Justice,
stated:
"I concur on the ground that the Probate
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Court has inherent power to enforce its order
to pay money owing to its ward; that any discharge is conditional on the guardian so doing.
The order to show cause was in pursuance of this
inherent power."
The san1e rule has been set forth by our court in
In re Brooks' Estate, 83 Utah 506, 30 Pac. 2d 1065, wherein the court stated:
"The ultimate end to be accomplished by a
probate proceeding is to vest possession, or both
title and possession, of the property of the estate
in those entitled thereto. The duties of an administrator are not completed until the property of
the estate has been delivered to the persons to
whom the probate court directs that it shall be
delivered whether it be a claim allowed against
the estate or a decree of distribution. The administrator has not performed the trust imposed
upon him by law until and unless he pays the
claim or delivers the property to the distributee.
R. S. Utah 1933, 102-9-25, 102-11-20, 102-11-21,
102-12-19. The duties of an administrator are not
fully performed until he has not only accounted
for, but also distributed, as ordered by the court,
all of the assets of the estate which has come int•>
his possession as administrator. Ehrngren v.
Gronlund, 19 Utah 411, 57 P. 268."

1

In the instant case the order of February 27, 1945
approved a stipulation for a settlement which was to
become binding "upon the acceptance of his portion of
said fund and the execution of the necessary instnnnenb
to receipt therefor and to assign his said interest and
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release the said estate. That the said settlement shall
become binding as to each of said heirs accepting the
same and executing such instruments." (Tr. 87). It is
implicit in this order that if the moneys proposed to be
paid by the settlement are not accepted and if the instruments, namely, the assignment by the heirs of their distributive share of the estate to the widow, are not received, that there then must be a distribution to those
heirs of their interest in the estate as fixed by law.
Section 74-4-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953. The District
Court has not changed that order but further incorporated it in the order of October 9, 1945. We contend
that the District Court has continued to have the inherent power to determine why this order was not carried
out and to complete the probate of this estate. There
has been no distribution effected when the two orders
of the District Court are examined together and until
a distribution is made the District Court should retain
jurisdiction over the property of the estate and no discharge of the administrators could be made. Any such
discharge is conditional upon the estate having been
fully administered, including a distribution to the parties
entitled, with the proper showing of receipt of such
distribution by them. Section 75-12-19, Utah Code Awnotated 1953.
POINT 4.
PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO HAVE DISTRIBUTION MADE TO THEM OF THEIR DISTRIBUTIVE SHARES
OF THE ASSETS OF SAID ESTATE IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE LAWS OF SUCCESSION.
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The law in Utah is clearly settled that title to real
property vests in the heirs at the instant of death of
the decedent, subject to probate. In Chamberlain v.
Larsen, 83 Utah 420, 29 Pac. 2d 355, the court clearly
set forth the following rule:
"Upon the death of the decedent, the title
to any property of which she died possessed,
immediately passed to and vested in her heirs,
subject to administration and the payment of
debts. The purpose of an adjudication of heirship is not to vest title, but to adjudicate where
the title of the decedent has already vested.
Regardless of whether there had been an adjudication of heirship, the rights of heirs can be
asserted or defended in any proper manner."
The provisions of our probate code clearly contemplate that title vested in the heirs and that the administrator is entitled to take possession of the real property
only for the purpose of completion of the probate,
which includes payment of the debts of the decedent,
collection of the rents and profits from the real property
during the interim of the probate and ultimately determining the rights of the heirs and their respective shares
in the real property.

Section 75-12-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides as follows:
"Partition or distribution of the real estate
may be made as provided in this chapter, although
some of the original heirs, legatees or devisees
may have conveyed their shares to other person:-;,
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and such shares must be assigned to the persons
holding the same in the same manner as they
otherwise would have been to such heirs, legatees
or devisees." (Italics ours).
Our statute clearly contemplates a conveyance by an
instrument ordinarily used for the transfer of title to
real property. In the case of In re Miles' Estate, 63
Utah 164, 223 Pac. 337, the sole heir of the estate executed an assignment, absolute in fonn, to a bank and
thereupon petitioned the court to distribute directly
to the bank. A creditor of the estate objected to the
proposed distribution upon the grounds that the assignments referred to in the petition were not conveyances
in fact but were made merely to secure the payment of
a note. The Utah Supreme Court held that the transfer
was not a conveyance as contemplated by our statute,
using the following language:
"We conclude that the court properly decided
that the assignment, though absolute in form,
but in fact intended as a mortgage, was not a
conveyance as contemplated by the statute entitling the assignee or mortgagee to have the estate
distributed to him."
A clear statement of the rule that distribution of
real property shall be made only to the heirs, or to a
grantee holding a duly executed conveyance from the
heirs executed in the manner required for the conveyance of real property, is set forth by the California
Supreme Court in In re Meyer's Estate, 238 Pac. 2d 597
(Cal.):
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"The rule is different as to a succession by
descent. The estate vests in the heir eo instante
upon the death of the ancestor; and no act of his
is required to perfect title. The estate is cast on
the heir by operation of law without regard to his
wishes or election. No assent or acceptance is
necessary. He cannot, by an act, cause the estate
to remain in the ancestor, for the latter is incapable of holding it after his death. He cannot,
by any renunciation or disclaimer, prevent the
passage of title to himself. Nor can he, by a
renunciation or disclaimer, transfer the estate
to any other person as the heir of the ancestor,
for the object of a renunciation or disclaimer is
not to transfer, but to prevent a transfer. He
can only make a transfer by some instrument
adapted to the transfer of the property."
Mr. Cotro-Manes was appointed by the probate
court to represent the non-resident heirs and he was
specifically directed to attempt to make contact with
those heirs and to properly bring them before the court
(Tr. 127). Mr. Cotro-Manes was not authorized to
execute on behalf of the non-resident heirs quitclaim.
deeds or any other instrument which would properly
convey the interest of those heirs in the real property
of ~he estate. The stipulation entered into by Mr. CotroManes, and approved by the probate court, contemplated
the execution by the heirs of the necessary instruments
to properly transfer and release their interest in the
estate. Such an instrument of necessity must have been
a conveyance of their interest in the real property. Such
instruments were not and have never been executed by
the heirs.
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One of the heirs represented by Mr. Cotro-Manes was
John G. Latsis, sometimes known as Constantinos John
Latsi:s, a minor, and he was recognized as such at the
time of ~Ir. Cotro-J\;fanes' appointment (Tr. 241). It was
a clear impossibility for this minor by himself, or through
the mere representation of J\1r. Cotro-Manes as his
attorney, to quitclaim any interest as an heir in the real
property of the estate. The necessity for the appointment of a general guardian for this minor was patent
and the appointment of such a guardian was one of the
steps toward distribution under the stipulation which
was absolutely necessary to the passing of title and to
the carrying out of the very provisions of the stipulation
itself.
We submit that the District Court erred in entering
its order of October 9, 1945 in not requiring as a prerequisite thereto a showing of the receipt of proper
instruments to pass title as contemplated in the stipulation and in the order of February 27, 1945. We further
submit that the instant probate is unfinished and uncompleted and that the District Court properly should have
entertained the petition of the non-resident heirs for
proper administration of the estate.
Our probate code requires as the final act of the
administrator, prior to actual distribution, a determination of heirship. Section 75-12-7, Utah Code Annota,ted
1953, requires that after the filing of a petition for final
distribution "the court must proceed to distribute the
residue of the estate in the hands of the executor or
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administrator among the persons who by law are entitled
thereto." Section 75-12-8 then provides that "In the
order or decree the court must name the persons and the
proportions or parts to which each shall be entitled,
* * * ." The order of October 9, 1945 did not set forth
the proportions or parts to which each heir was entitled.
Nowhere in the instant probate proceedings was there
any determination as to exactly what share of the estate
each heir, including Virginia Latsis, the widow, was
entitled to receive. As this determination of heirship
was an essential condition precedent to the closing of
the estate and final distribution, the failure to make such
a determination of heirship has left this probate unfinished and uncompleted. None of the heirs in Greece
have transferred their interests in the real property
of the estate and title thereto has remained vested in
them in some undetermined proportions.
POINT 5.
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS ORDERS OF
DECEMBER 12, 1952, DISMISSING THE PETITIONS DATED
OCTOBER 26, 1951 AND AUGUST 1, 1952, RESPECTIVELY.

On December 12, 1952 the District Court, by two
separate orders, dismissed the two petitions of the nonresident hei:r~s, both of which petitions directed the
court's attention to the improper acts of Utah Savings
& Trust Company and Virginia Latsis Zambukos, the
co-administrators, and further prayed that the co-administrators should be required to properly amninister
the estate. One of the orders of December 1~, 1952 was
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dismissing the petitions as to the trust company and the.
other order dismissed the petitions as to Virginia Latsis
Zambukos. The motions of the co-administrators to dismiss the petitions were identical and the grounds thereof
upon which the court based its orders of dismissal were
generally a claim of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter and failure of the petitioners to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.

In re Linford's Estate, 116 Utah 21, 207 Pac. 2d
1033, involved a factual situation closely analogous to
that of the instant case. In the Linford case a decree
of distribution was entered in December 1942. In April
1948 two heirs of the estate petitioned for an order to
show cause why the decree of distribution should not be
vacated and why the administratrix should not be compelled to file a true inventory and make a proper distribution. In granting 'such order, our court in the Linford
case approved the procedure taken by the heirs in atta:cking the decree of distribution. The court stated:
"This is not an action against the administratrix, but rather a petition directing the court's
attention to certain alleged fraudulent and improper acts on the part of the administratrix, and
requesting that the court require her to properly
administer the estate."
The court referred to In re Raleigh's Estate, 48 Utah
128, 158 Pac. 705, where Section 75-11-37, Utah Code
Aoootated 1953, providing for conclusiveness of settlement of the final account was construed. As to the conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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struction of that statute in the Raleigh case, our court
stated:

"* * * we construed the above quoted statute
to mean that the settlement of an account, whether
it be a final or an intermediary account, is conclusive as to all items included therein, provided
that the statutory requirement of notice has been
complied with, and no heir or party is laboring
under any legal disability, unless the settlement
is set aside in a proceeding in equity for fraud
or mistake prosecuted as are proceedings to set
aside other judgments. This case holds that the
statute does not preclude the court from charging
the personal representative with items of property
which he has not included in his final account."
(Italics ours).
We contend that no final distribution was ever made
in the instant case, nor could any final distribution be
made upon the conditions imposed by the prior order
of the probate court, which prior order was incorporated
in the order of October 9, 1945, and we submit that the
procedure approved by our court in the Linford case
should equally apply and that the co-administrators in
the instant case should now be compelled to fully administer this estate.
The notice that was given on the final order of
October 9, 1945 would indicate to any parties receiving
it that a full and normal intestate distribution was contemplated. We believe that to give our statutes l)l'Oviding for notice on distribution any meaning, if a modified
distribution or any distribution less than the normal
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intestate distribution is contemplated, that the notice
must so inform all interested parties and that failure to
give such notice is a jurisdictional defect. We have
previously quoted the Utah case of Barrette v. Whitney,
supra, which stands alone and is contrary to the general
rule. The widely accepted general rule contrary to Barrette v. Whitney has been set forth in a majority of states
allowing collateral attack where there is a want of jurisdiction because of improper notice on a decree of distribution. Teynor v. Heible, 133 Pac. 1 (Wash.); Baker v.
Riordan, 4 Pac. 232 (Cal.) ; 21 Am. Jur. 655, Section 490.
See also cases cited on page 17, supra.
Irrespective of any consideration of the matter of
notice or want of notice, and aside from any application
of Barrette v. Whitney or the discredit which that decision has received from the courts of the sister states, the
startling fact remains that title to the real property
vested in the heirs at the date of death. Only an instrument of conveyance could divest those heirs and transfer
title to Virginia Latsis. No such instrument was ever
executed, and title has remained in the heirs. We grant
that by an appropriate action in the nature of a suit
for specific performance, or other proper proceedings
where the facts and jurisdiction warrant it, the court
could order a conveyance or make a judgment of conveyance. No such action was brought, and irrespective
of the procedural gymnastics of the administrator~s the
title today is vested in the heirs subject to the cloud
of the orders of distribution.
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One of the grounds for dismissal was the claimed
failure of the petitioners to join an indispensable party,
presumably a grantee of the widow, to whom conveyance
has been made of estate properties. The relief sought
by the petitioners is an action directed against the two
co-administrators for completion of the probate and for
a distribution according to the laws of succession. The
relief available to the petitioners can be had only from
the administrators of the estate.
CONCLUSION
The entire contention of the non-resident heirs of
James John Latsis is that the District Court erred in
dismissing the petitions of those heirs for completion of
probate proceedings and in thereby denying jurisdiction
over the estate and the acts of the co-administrators.
The acts of those fiduciaries in an attempted distribution were void. The order directing such distribution incorporated a prior order which imposed a condition precedent to its operation and effectiveness. That
condition was the acceptance of the stipulation in property settlement, the receipt of moneys payable thereunder
and the execution and receipt of proper instruments in
transfer of the interests of the non-resident heirs. Those
instruments must of necessity have included conveyances
of the interests in real property of the estate.
None of the court-imposed prerequisites to the yalidity of the modified distribution were fulfilled. To a;.;;.;ure
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the non-resident heirs of due proces's, they must have
had notice of any distribution other than that assured
them by the laws of succession. Such notice they did
not receive, and such notice was not given.
To ignore the fact that the heirs in Greece received
no knowledge or notice of the death of decedent or of
any of the probate proceedings until 1950 (Tr. 184),
and to allow a disinheritance of those heirs by the arbitrary and wilful acts of the co-administrators of this
estate, is unconscionable.
In the interests of justice to those heirs in Greece
who, by their distance and remoteness from the scene
of these proceedings, must rely on our courts for the
preservation of their rights, it is prayed that the orders
of the District Court dismissing the petitions of the nonresident heirs for completion of the probate proceedings
be reversed and that this matter be remanded to the
District Court for vacating of the order of October 9,
1945 and for further administration of this estate, including an order for final distribution in accordance
with the laws of succession.
Respectfully submitted,
WHITE, WRIGHT & ARNOVITZ
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & MATTS.SON
JAMES W. BELESS, JR.

Attorneys for Petitioners and
Appellants
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